

The Social Power of a Uniform¹

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The degree and basis of social power of uniformed figures was investigated in two field experiments. In the first experiment, subjects were stopped in the street by an experimenter dressed in one of three ways: a civilian, a milkman, or a guard. They were asked to pick up a paper bag, or to give a dime to a stranger, or to move away from a bus stop. The results indicated that the subjects complied more with the guard than with the civilian or milkman. In the second field experiment, designed to examine the basis of the guard's power, subjects were asked to give a dime to a stranger under conditions of either surveillance or nonsurveillance. The guard's power was not affected by the surveillance manipulation. A logical analysis of social power indicated that the guard's power was most likely based on legitimacy. Two questionnaire studies indicated, however, that college students did not perceive the guard as having either more power or more legitimacy than the milkman or civilian. The nature and importance of understanding legitimacy was discussed.

It is likely that the degree to which a person will comply with orders is partially determined by the characteristics of the person who gives the orders. One way to identify those individuals who possess authority is by their attire. Joseph and Alex (1972) point out that uniforms serve to identify the wearer's status, group membership, and legitimacy. Throughout history the uniform has been used as a symbol of authority. In the armed forces, uniforms are of great importance in signifying relative power. Witness the difficulty in changing the type of uniform worn in the U.S. Navy (New York Times, July 25, 1971). Possibly those higher up in the hierarchy did not want subordinates to wear uniforms similar to their own.

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Previous research dealing with dress has explored how it represents social class (Bickman, 1971) or life styles. It has been found that appearance can affect other's honesty (Bickman, 1971), helping behavior (Enswiller, Deaux, & Willits, 1971; Raymond & Unger, 1971), and political behavior (Suedfeld, Bochner, & Matas, 1971; Zimbardo, 1971). Research dealing with uniforms, however, has not examined the effect it may have on others, but instead investigated the effect it had on the wearer (Singer, Brush, & Lublin, 1965; Zimbardo, 1969).

A theoretical approach useful in understanding the operation of authority is provided by social power theory. Among the theoretical and empirical studies of social power reviewed by Collins and Raven (1969) and by Schopler (1965), research on the bases or types of power is most relevant to the present research. French and Raven (1959) developed a system of categorizing the bases of social power. They suggest the following as the bases of power:

(1) Reward power rests on the person's belief that the influencing agent has in his possession some resource which the individual feels he can obtain by conforming to the agent's request.

(2) Coercive power is based on the agent's ability to punish noncompliance.

(3) Legitimate power is based on internalized values which specify that an agent has a legitimate right to exert influence and that this influence ought to be accepted. Cultural values, acceptance of the social hierarchy, or role prescriptions are often the basis of legitimate power. Obedience and compliance to an experimenter's orders in laboratory situations are probably based on legitimate power (Block & Block, 1952; Frank, 1944; Milgram, 1963, 1965).

(4) Referent power is based on the identification with the agent. The agent derives his power from his attractiveness.

(5) Expert power stems from the perception that the agent possesses superior knowledge or ability. Expert power operates only as long as the agent is seen as acting in good faith and within the area of this expertness.

(6) Informational power, added later (Collins & Raven, 1969), is based on information communicated by the agent.

The purpose of the present research is to measure the relative degree of social power that uniformed authorities possess and to determine the basis of this power. Clearly one of our working hypotheses is that the uniform symbolizes authority. One way of understanding the nature of authority is to examine its efficacy in a domain removed from the context in which it "typically" operates. For example, observing that a physician is able to get us to undress at his request in the privacy of his examining room tells us something about the nature of his authority. His ability to accomplish this in a public setting would tell us much more.

The purpose of Experiment I⁴ was to examine if uniformed persons, acting out of role, did indeed have greater power than nonuniformed persons. One of the main reasons for using out-of-role behavior is to examine the limits of the power of a uniform. It might be that the power associated with a given role, e.g. policeman, might be more closely associated with the symbol of that role, the uniform, than with the role of the authority as such. Experiment I was designed specifically to test the hypothesis that a uniformed guard has more ability to influence individuals than does the same person in a low-authority uniform (milkman) or one wearing conventional dress. Experiment II was designed to investigate the basis of this social power.

EXPERIMENT I

Method

Subjects

Ss were 153 adult pedestrians on a street in the Flatbush section of Brooklyn, New York. A pedestrian was chosen to be an *S* by *E* if he was the first person who came along who could not have observed interaction with the previous *S*. *E* always chose a pedestrian who was alone. Ss were limited to pedestrians between the ages of 18 and 61.

The age of *S* was estimated, in 5-year intervals, independently by *E* and an observer. The average age of Ss was estimated to be 39 years (correlation between an observer and experimenter estimates was $r = .94$). Forty-three percent were male and 57% female. Most (86%) were white, 11% were black, and the race of the remainder could not be determined. Almost all (85%) Ss were judged, on the basis of dress, to be middle class.

Procedure

Variation of authority figures. The authority of the four male *E*s was varied by their type of dress. For the lowest level of authority (civilian) *E* was dressed in a sports jacket and tie. The next level of authority, the milkman, was chosen because it was assumed that the uniform would be recognized as such, but would be seen as one with little authority. *E* was dressed in white and carried a milkman's basket containing empty milk bottles. The highest degree of authority was represented by a guard. Superficially, the uniform may have appeared to be a policeman's. The badge and insignia were different, however, and *E* did not carry a gun.

⁴Experiment I was reported at the 79th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, September 1971.

The four *E*s were white males between the ages of 18 and 20. All fitted into a size 40 suit and thus were similar in physique. They were not told the purpose of the experiment and were instructed to act the same way regardless of which uniform they were wearing. All *E*s completed approximately the same number of experimental sessions in the various uniforms and situations. The experiment was conducted during the weekdays, with 77% of the data collected during the afternoons.

Variations in situations. Three situations were used to examine the generality of the relationship between uniforms and social power. Since these situations were chosen to differ from each other along many dimensions, no prediction was made comparing compliance in the three situations.

(1) Picking up the bag. *E* (in appropriate dress) stopped the chosen *S* and pointed to a small paper bag lying on the ground and said, "Pick up this bag for me!" If *S* did not immediately comply, *E* added that he had a bad back. *S* was considered to have obeyed if he picked up the bag.

(2) Dime and meter. *E* stopped the chosen *S*, pointed to a confederate standing beside a car parked at a parking meter and said, "This fellow is over-parked at the meter but doesn't have any change. Give him a dime!" If *S* did not immediately comply, *E* added that he had no change either. *S* was considered to have obeyed if he gave the confederate a dime or made a sincere effort to find change by searching for it.

(3) Bus Stop—No Standing. In this situation a person was chosen to be an *S* if he was standing alone at a bus stop. *S* was approached and told, "Don't you know you have to stand on the other side of the pole? The sign says 'No Standing'." The "No Standing," of course, refers to the fact that it is illegal for a car to stand in a bus stop. If *S* did not immediately comply, *E* added, "Then the bus won't stop here, it's a new law." In all three situations if *S* did not obey after the explanation, *E* left.

Results and Discussion

Table 1 shows the total percentage of *S*s who obeyed. In every situation, *S*s were more obedient to the higher authority figure. Both the uniform ($\chi^2 = 21.79$; $p < .001$; $df = 2$) and the situation ($\chi^2 = 9.39$; $p < .01$; $df = 2$) significantly affected obedience. The effect of the uniform was similar in each situation (interaction $\chi^2 = .26$; $df = 4$; *NS*).

Table 1 shows that there was no significant difference between obedience to the milkman and obedience to the civilian. The guard, however, received significantly more compliance than did the civilian ($\chi^2 = 7.73$; $p < .01$; $df = 1$) or milkman ($\chi^2 = 4.04$; $p < .05$; $df = 1$).

An analysis of the number of *S*s initially obeying without the additional explanation (e.g., "I have no change") showed that the uniforms had a

TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE OF SUBJECTS OBEYING FOR
EACH UNIFORM AND EACH CONDITION
IN EXPERIMENT I

Uniform	Situation					
	Paper bag		Dime		Bus stop	
	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%	<i>N</i>	%
Civilian	14	36	24	33	15	20
Milkman	14	64	14	57	14	21
Guard	22	82	20	89	16	56

significant effect ($\chi^2 = 8.84$; $p < .02$; $df = 2$). Across the three situations, 19% obeyed the civilian, 14% the milkman, and 38% the guard. Obedience to the guard was significantly different from obedience to the milkman ($\chi^2 = 5.62$; $p < .02$; $df = 1$) and to the civilian ($\chi^2 = 4.02$; $p < .05$; $df = 1$). The situations were also significantly related to obedience ($\chi^2 = 16.67$; $p < .001$; $df = 2$). The highest percentage of *Ss* obeyed in the dime situation (41%) followed by those in the paper bag situation (22%). Seven percent of *Ss* initially obeyed *E* in the bus stop situation. There was no significant interaction between uniform and situation ($\chi^2 = 2.10$; $df = 4$).

Twenty-five percent of *Ss* complied with the *E*'s request with no explanation. When given some kind of reason for the demand, however, 36% of the initially nonobedient *Ss* complied. For the majority, compliance did not occur immediately on demand. How the explanation influenced *Ss*' behavior still needs to be investigated. The explanation given may have provided an indication of the seriousness of *E*'s request, or it might have given *Ss* additional time to think and realize what they had to do. Many *Ss* appeared to be surprised when they were stopped. On the other hand, the explanation could have changed the meaning of the request. Although *E* spoke in a demanding manner, it is possible that his explanations made the situation more similar to a request for help rather than a demand. This especially would be the case in the paper bag situation where *E* said he had a bad back. It would be more difficult, however, to interpret the dime and bus stop explanations as being requests for help. Thus, although the research was designed to measure compliance with or obedience to a demand, some *Ss* could have interpreted the situation as a request for help. The latter would probably only be true for those who heard the explanation.

Neither the sex nor the age of the subjects were significantly related to compliance with the request. There were no significant differences between the four *E*s in the degree of compliance they obtained.

Three situations were used to have some confidence in the generality of the relationship between uniforms and social power. Although the guard obtained the most obedience in all three situations, there were significant differences among situations. In particular, the least compliance was obtained in the bus stop situation. This situation differed from the others in that *S*'s behavior was prescribed while in the others he was asked to do something for someone else. More important, this situation was designed to put *S* in conflict with a demand based on an invalid premise. Almost any New Yorker knows that the "No Standing" on the bus stop sign refers to cars and not to people waiting for a bus. This routinely based behavior should be difficult to change. More research appears to be indicated to explore situational aspects of compliance to authority.

Since it was demonstrated that power was related to the type of uniform and not the mere presence of a uniform, an analysis of the basis of this power can be attempted. Raven (1971) differentiates the six bases of social power into three general categories based on whether the relationship was independent of the agent, dependent on the agent and requiring surveillance, or dependent without surveillance being necessary. Informational power is considered to be socially independent of the agent since the agent only provides information which leads to immediately internalized cognitive changes.

Coercion and reward are the two bases of power that are socially dependent and require surveillance. Raven considers observability critical for the operation of these two bases of power. The agent whose power is based on reward or coercion has the ability to mediate reward or punishment. An individual would comply with an agent's request only if surveillance were possible. There is no reason to fear punishment for noncompliance or expect reward for compliance unless the influencing agent is aware of the individual's compliance. Studies by Kelman (1958) and Raven and French (1958) have shown that coercive power is not effective unless the subject perceives that the agent is aware of his behavior. Coercive power may be responsible for the guard's effectiveness. The guard, as a representative of law enforcement, could have been perceived as a source of possible harassment or threat. Secord and Backman (1964), in discussing social power theory, suggest that police power is based mainly on coercion.

The remaining three sources of power—expert, reference, and legitimacy—are socially dependent without requiring surveillance. That is, social influence depends upon the individual's relationship to the agent but not on whether the individual believes that his behavior is under the scrutiny of the influencing agent.

Although the various types of power may produce similar levels of initial overt behavioral compliance, the degree to which surveillance is important is critical in analyzing the basis of the agent's power. For example, if the guard's power is based on either reward or coercion, then he should have more ability to

influence under surveillance than under nonsurveillance. However, if the guard's power is based on, for example, legitimacy, then surveillance should have no effect on the guard's power. The aim of Experiment II was to examine whether the guard's social power was affected by surveillance.

EXPERIMENT II

Method

Subjects

Ss were 48 adult pedestrians on a street in the Park Slope section of Brooklyn, New York. Ss were selected in the same manner as in Experiment I.

The age of Ss was estimated (in 10-year intervals) independently by *E* and an observer. The average age of Ss was estimated to be 46 years (correlation between observer and *E* was $r = .96$). Sixty percent were male and 40% female. Only one *S* was not Caucasian. All were judged by their appearance to be middle class.

Procedure

Two levels of authority were used in Experiment II: the guard and civilian. The three *Es* (different from those used in Experiment I) were white males between the ages of 20 and 24 and similar in physique. As in Experiment I, *Es* were not told the purpose of the research and were instructed to behave in the same way regardless of which uniform they were wearing. The experiment was conducted on three Saturdays.

Surveillance Condition

The procedure followed in this condition was the same one used in the dime and meter situation in Experiment I. *E* pointed to a confederate standing beside a car parked at a meter and said, "This fellow is over-parked at the meter but doesn't have any change. Give him a dime!" This entire interaction took place in front of the parking meter. Compliance was judged in the same manner as in Experiment I.

Nonsurveillance Condition

In this condition *E* approached *S* approximately 50 feet from the parking meter. *S* was walking in the direction of the meter while *E* was walking away from it. As *E* stepped into *S*'s path, he said, "You see that guy over there by the meter (pointing). He's over-parked but doesn't have any change. Give him a dime!" By the time *S* reached the confederate's location, *E* had turned the corner and was no longer in sight.

TABLE 2
 PERCENTAGE OF SUBJECTS OBEYING FOR EACH
 UNIFORM UNDER SURVEILLANCE AND NON-
 SURVEILLANCE CONDITIONS IN EXPERIMENT II

Uniform	Condition	
	Surveillance (<i>N</i> = 12)	Nonsurveillance (<i>N</i> = 12)
Civilian	50	42
Guard	75	92

In both conditions, *E* told *Ss* who did not comply that he did not have any change either. In contrast to Experiment I, *E* waited somewhat longer before giving the explanation. With this added time, *S* had more of an opportunity to either comply or leave before *E* gave the explanation. However, *Ss* in the nonsurveillance condition who did not respond to the experimenter's initial request were not given an explanation. Thus in only about one quarter of the cases was an explanation given.

Results and Discussion

Table 2 shows the total percentage of *Ss* who obeyed. Overall, 83% obeyed the guard, and 46% obeyed the civilian. This difference is statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 5.83$; $p < .02$; $df = 1$), thus replicating the results found in Experiment I. In addition, all *Ss* responded positively in some way (verbally or nodding of the head), to *E* in the guard condition, but seven *Ss* in the civilian condition just tried to ignore the order.

Table 2 shows that surveillance had no effect on compliance ($\chi^2 = 0$). It thus appears that neither reward nor coercive power was responsible for the increased level of compliance achieved by the guard.⁵ What then is the basis of his power? At this point it can be concluded that it is most likely based on informational, referent, expert, or legitimate power, or a combination of these. Without further research only a logical analysis of the bases of power is possible.

Referent power appears the easiest to eliminate logically. It is doubtful that the pedestrians in these studies identified with the guard and wanted to be like him. In fact, there was probably greater similarity between these middle-class

⁵ Further evidence arguing against a coercive-power interpretation comes from a small sample (five) of *Ss* who were interviewed after their interaction with the guard. All five *Ss* reported that they thought it was all right to be asked to give a dime and that they felt they had nothing to fear from the guard.

subjects and the well-dressed college student than there was between them and a guard.

Informational and expert power would appear to operate most strongly in the bus stop situation where the guard could have been perceived as having special knowledge about changes in laws. However, this is the situation in which the least compliance was obtained. It is also not clear that the uniformed individual possessed superior knowledge or information in the paper bag or dime situations. Thus, informational or expert power does not appear to explain the greater ability of the guard to obtain more compliance.

The remaining type of influence is based on legitimate power. It seems paradoxical that the guard's power should be based on legitimacy since the situations in which this power was examined were intentionally designed to be out of role. Certainly there are many situations in which a guard can legitimately prescribe behavior. Is it within his range of legitimate power, however, to order people to give money to a stranger or pick up a bag they did not drop? Experiment III was designed to investigate this question.

EXPERIMENT III

A. Perceived Legitimacy

A more direct method for examining the legitimacy is to ask Ss to rate the *legitimacy of certain requests*.

Method

Ss used in this study were 141 Smith College students. Each S randomly received a questionnaire in which either a young man, milkman, or guard was described as stopping someone on the street and telling them to do something. There were 29 situations described including the three situations used in Experiment I. Ss were asked to rate the legitimacy of the request on a 10-point scale where 1 was very legitimate and 10 was not legitimate at all.

Results and Discussion

A simple analysis of variance was performed on Ss' ratings of legitimacy. In none of the situations used in Experiment I was there any significant effect associated with the uniform. Of the 26 other situations presented, 8 showed significant ($p < .05$) effects of the uniform on the rating of legitimacy. The eight situations, in which the guard was seen as less legitimate, were asking someone to: smile, sing a tune, deliver a package, laugh, mail a letter, tie his shoes, and carry a package.

The results of this study indicate that, for the situations studied, the guard is not perceived as acting with more legitimacy than either a civilian or a milkman. Interestingly the mean ratings of legitimacy were 5.3 for the dime situation, 5.7 for the bag and 7.3 for the bus stop. The ratings of the first two situations are close to the midpoint on the legitimacy scale. It thus appears that these requests from a guard would be seen as being neither no less nor no more legitimate than requests from a civilian or milkman. As suspected, it does not appear that these behaviors are incorporated into the recognized role of the guard.

B. Predicting Behavior

An alternative way to examine social power is to present Ss with a hypothetical situation and ask them what they and others would do in that situation. The higher the perceived social power of the influencing agent, the more likely it is that Ss would predict that both themselves and others would comply. This would especially be the case if the social power were based on legitimacy, since this type of power is often based on cultural norms.

Method

Ss used in this questionnaire study were 189 Smith College students. These Ss did not participate in Experiment IIIA. Each student randomly received a questionnaire describing one of the previously used situations (bag, dime, or bus stop) with one of the previously described figures giving the order (young man, milkman, or guard). There were 21 Ss in each condition.

Ss were asked to suppose that the previously described situation happened to them and to predict what they and people in general would do.

Results

Table 3 shows the total percentage of Ss who reported that they would obey the agent. As in Experiment I there was a significant difference between the three situations ($\chi^2 = 8.76$; $p < .025$; $df = 2$). However, there was no effect attributable to the uniform ($\chi^2 = .05$; *NS*). Table 4 shows the average percentage of "others" who Ss thought would comply with the agent's request. A 3×3 analysis of variance performed on the number of others complying indicates that there was a significant effect only for situations ($F = 9.17$; $df = 2/180$; $p < .005$).

The results of this questionnaire indicate that neither the Ss themselves nor their perceptions of what others would do was affected by the uniform. It appears that these Ss did not perceive that the guard would have more social power in these situations.

TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF SUBJECTS IN EXPERIMENT IIIB
WHO REPORTED THEY WOULD OBEY THE AGENT

Uniform	Situation		
	Paper bag (<i>N</i> = 21)	Dime (<i>N</i> = 21)	Bus stop (<i>N</i> = 21)
Civilian	95	71	66
Milkman	90	80	57
Guard	76	80	71

These data can be interpreted to mean that people's predictions of how they and others would behave in relation to authorities is not a good predictor of actual behavior. The implication is that the predictions people make about their behavior in dealing with authorities cannot be counted on for protecting them from carrying out what they also may perceive as not being orders from a legitimate authority.

The interpretation of both questionnaire studies is tentative because of other factors that might explain the discrepancy between the field and questionnaire studies. *Ss* in the questionnaire studies probably took the requests more seriously and were not as free to define the situation as a prank regardless of the uniform. It is also possible that *Ss* in the questionnaire studies were incapable of feeling the annoyance or fear that *Ss* in the actual experiment might have felt. Finally, Smith students may not be representative of the *S* population sampled in the field experiments.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Although the questionnaire studies cast some doubt on the legitimacy interpretation, a closer examination of this concept should be helpful. Typically

TABLE 4
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF "OTHERS" WHO THE
SUBJECTS IN EXPERIMENT IIIB PREDICTED
WOULD OBEY

Uniform	Situation		
	Paper bag	Dime	Bus stop
Civilian	69	50	68
Milkman	74	54	59
Guard	77	63	73

legitimate power has been examined in formal settings such as supervisor-subordinate relationships. Legitimate power is usually defined in terms of roles or positions in which the agent has the right to prescribe behavior in a given domain. Raven and Kruglanski (1970), however, consider legitimate power to be a much more widespread phenomenon and define any compliance that has an "ought to" quality about it as being legitimate power. It is as if the subject reasoned, "I did it because he told me and he has the right to tell me to do it." These authors, however contend that legitimacy is limited to situations in which the agent occupies a position which "specifically vests such legitimate power in him [p. 75]."

Instead of viewing legitimacy from a sociological role or position point of view it might be more helpful to examine it from a psychological viewpoint. Flacks (1969) provides three general propositions that he believes are important in understanding how legitimacy is attributed to an authority. Flacks contends that individuals tend to attribute legitimacy to an authority when (a) "the exercise of that authority is perceived as beneficial to groups, institutions, or values to which the individual is committed [p. 131]"; (b) "the perception that those in authority are not biased against one or that the working of the system does not result in special costs for oneself or one's group [p. 132]" (i.e., you trust the authority); and (c) a person perceives a "generalized consensus supporting legitimacy [p. 133]."

The person's perception and evaluation of the authority may be of greater importance in determining his legitimacy than specific orders given by the authority figure. Does the person trust the authority, see the authority's actions as generally beneficial, and feel that others would support his opinion? It is plausible that Ss in the field experiment perceived the guard in this manner.

It seems reasonable that the physical appearance of an individual attempting to interrupt ongoing behavior serves as a useful cue in identifying his intentions. Until he speaks, his appearance is the only source of information available. Whether an attempt will be made to block off his appeal entirely or give it a low priority will be determined by the person's appearance. Thus, appearance can serve as a cue for intentions.

When a civilian approaches someone on the street and orders him to give someone a dime (or pick up a bag, etc.), the person given the order is likely to dismiss the civilian as a crackpot or someone who is playing a practical joke and thus not comply with the order. Someone in a guard's uniform, however, is likely to be taken more seriously. This is someone who has a responsible job, who is doing something beneficial for society, and who is usually trusted. Thus, the guard has a degree of legitimacy that is associated with his uniform that may not be directly related to the functions of his role. On the basis of this cueing it is plausible that the guard has greater legitimacy than does the civilian or milkman. It would be a time- and energy-consuming task to question the

legitimacy of most authority figures dealt with in everyday life. A dependence or trust develops in which it is assumed that there are good intentions supporting the agent's actions. Further research appears to be needed to determine what the specified limits of authority figures are. When are orders from an authority clearly seen as being illegitimate?

The ease or difficulty with which the orders of authority figures is obeyed can have important implications for society. Boulding (1969) points out that "the dynamic of legitimacy is perhaps the most important single element in the total social system [p. 151]." Flacks (1969) believes that the legitimacy of the United States government has declined among the youth. He points out that even military personnel are affected. There have been a number of recent incidents in which soldiers have refused to follow the orders of their officers in combat situations. There are other examples, however, such as My Lai, that demonstrate the opposite reaction to orders from authorities. Certainly if changes in the legitimacy of authorities are taking place they can lead to major realignments within society.

Evidence other than a logical or conceptual analysis of the power of a uniform can be sought. Bases of power can also be distinguished by examining the personal feelings the person has toward the agent and how he perceives the causes of his own behavior. It is also probable that a uniformed authority's power may include several bases of power that may combine in a nonadditive fashion.

The field situations used in the present experiment can be used to investigate other aspects of social power. For example, previous writing on the nature of authority (Bierstedt, 1967) has held that the exercise of authority does not involve personal qualities of the authority but is a property of social organization. Thus, it would be predicted that the physical characteristics of the agent would be important only when his power was based on coercion.

It is highly probable that uniformed governmental authorities have even more legitimate social power than did the guard in the present research. Legitimate power can have an important effect on the ability of governmental or other authorities to manipulate citizens even when they are unable to keep each and every member of the population under surveillance or to directly administer rewards or punishment. Kelman and Lawrence (1972) conducted a national survey dealing with attitudes toward Lt. William Calley and My Lai. The results of this study suggested that a large segment of the United States population has the potential to commit extreme forms of violence under orders from a legitimate authority. The understanding of how this power develops—and what the limits of power are—thus becomes very important.

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